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and acquiescing in the location thereof. ' 20 When the requisite
consent is not present, the possessor is considered to hold as an
occupant and not by adverse possession as is required by Article
853.21 In this situation it will be necessary to establish thirty
years possession as a prerequisite to prescription under Article
852.
Allen B. Pierson, Jr.
PROPERTY - TRANSFER OF IMMOVABLE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
ESTOPPEL AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

-

Plaintiff brought suit to be declared owner of land which his
wife had purchased during marriage and sold to a third party
without his written consent. There was no recital in the act of
sale that the property was purchased by the wife in her name as
her separate property, and the district court, applying the presumption that such property was part of the community of
acquets and gains, annulled the purported sale because it lacked
the husband's signature. The court of appeal held, reversed.
Since the husband was instrumental in arranging the sale by
the wife, was actually present at its execution and received a
part of the consideration, he ratified the act of sale and could
not sue to rescind it because his signature was absent. The
vendee was not acquiring property by estoppel since the wife
here had a deed in her name. Cato v. Bynum, 98 So.2d 257 (La.
App. 1957).
The opinion in the instant case lends itself to two distinct
interpretations. On first reading it would appear that the husband's signature is being supplied by parol testimony, under a
plea of estoppel, to pass title to community property of which
the wife is record owner. On the other hand, the court's language may easily be taken to mean that the husband, by his
conduct at the time of the sale, is estopped to assert the character of the property in question as community, thus making a
sale by the wife alone translative of title, since a sale of the
separate property of the wife does not require the signature of
the husband. The first of these interpretations involves a consideration of the parol evidence rule.
It is the generally accepted principle in Louisiana that title
20. Blanchard v. Monrose, 12 La. App. 503, 506, 125 So. 891, 893 (1930).
21. Williams v. Bernstein, 51 La. Ann. 115, 25 So. 411 (1899).
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to immovable property cannot be established by parol. 1 Considerable effort has been made to avoid the application of this
rule by the doctrine of estoppel in pais, which in effect provides

that one will not be heard in his own interest to controvert or
deny the truth of a state of facts which he has openly and publicly led others to believe, and upon the faith of which they have
acted. 2 As far back as 1850 the Louisiana courts have sustained

the transfer of immovable property under such an equitable
plea, holding that where one stands by and is silent while his
property is sold, he is estopped to dispute the purchaser's title;
but in such cases there has always been some written evidence
introduced to support the plea of estoppel. 3 In the absence of
written evidence, the courts have refused to sustain the transfer
of immovable property. 4 In the language of the decisions, "title
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2440 (1870) : "All sales of immovable property shall
be made by authentic act or under private signature. Except as provided in article 2275, every verbal sale of immovables shall be null, as well for third persons
as for the contracting parties themselves, and the testimonial proof of it shall not
be admitted."
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2275 (1870): "Every transfer of immovable property
must be in writing; but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such property,
be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well as against the vendee, who
confesses it when interrogated on oath, provided actual delivery has been made of
the immovable property thus sold."
Lemoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So.2d 392 (1948), 21 TUL. L. REV. 706
(1947) ; Sexton v. Waggoner, 66 So.2d 634 (La. App. 1953) ; Johnson v. Sandifer,
56 So.2d 762 (La. App. 1952) (rule applied to an executory contract to sell).
See generally Sarpy, Form in Louisiana Contracts Involving Rights in Property, 14 TuL. L. REV. 16 (1939) ; SAUNDEns, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 460
et seq. (1925).
The formality of writing is dispensed with in those areas where immovable
property is acquired by operation of law, i.e., judicial sale. LA. CIVIL CODE bk.
III, tit. VII, c. 9, Of Sales by Auction, or Public Sales (1870) ; Comment, 17
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 197 (1956); heirship, LA. CIVIL CODE, bk. III, tit. I,
Of Successions; prescription, bk. III, tit. XXIII, Of Occupancy, Possession and
Prescription (1870).
2. This doctrine is discussed in Harvey v. Richards, 200 La. 97, 7 So.2d 674
(1942) ; Harper v. Learned, 199 La. 398, 6 So.2d 326 (1942) ; Jackson v. United
Gas Public Service Co., 196 La. 1, 198 So. 633 (1940); Blanchard v. Allain, 5
La. Ann. 367 (1850). See Annot., 50 A.L.R. 671 (1927).
3. Davidson v. Silliman, 24 La. Ann. 225 (1872) (wife was estopped to assert
title to property sold by executors of her deceased husband's estate since she ratified the sale, the proc~s verbal showing that she was adjudicatee of at least
two thirds of the entire property sold) ; Blanchard v. Allain, 5 La. Ann. 367
(1850) (party signed inventory of succession, proc~s verbal of family meeting
and adjudication).
Written evidence was also present in Wimbish v. Mayer, 144 La. 866, 81 So.
373 (1919) ; Lippmins v. McCranie, 30 La. Ann. 1251 (1878) ; Nicholls v. Mercier, 15 La. Ann. 370 (1860).
See Harvey v. Richards, 200 La. 97, 7 So.2d 674 (1942), where the defendant,
although he signed as witness an act of sale between the plaintiff's vendor and
his son transferring property of which he was record owner, was not estopped to
assert title to property in question, because the plaintiff failed to prove that the
defendant knew of the discrepancy and that the plaintiff's vendor was misled in
any way by his act.
4. Snelling v. Adair, 196 La. 624, 637, 199 So. 782 (1940) ("The pleas of
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to immovable property cannot be acquired by estoppel." 5 This
principle has been applied to transfers involving the mandate
to sell or purchase immovable property. The authority of the

agent in such a transfer must be in writing, 6 and the courts
have for the most part been consistent in their rejection of parol
testimony to establish this authority.7 While in the case of Bradford-Kennedy v. Brown8 the doctrine of estoppel was used to

preclude a principal from denying the authority of an agent,
thus eliminating by parol the necessity of written proof, that
case has apparently never been followed. There is no apparent
reason why authorization to transfer immovable commercial

partnership property should not follow the general rule ;9 yet
there are several cases standing as an exception to the proposition that "title to immovable property cannot be acquired by

estoppel." Partners, who receive a portion of the purchase price,
have been estopped to assert title to commercial partnership
property sold by a fellow partner without written authority. 10

In the case here discussed the property was presumed community property since the wife bought it during the existence
of the community with no recitation in the act of sale that it
estoppel, ratification, and acquiescence, which are based on the long silence and
inaction of the plaintiff and her ancestor, are equally unimpressive, for one can
never be divested of his title to property except in the manner prescribed by law") ;
Pearce v. Ford, 124 La. 851, 50 So. 771 (1909) (silence and inaction will not
bring about the loss of title to real estate, unless in connection with the prescription established by law).
Accord, Sun Oil Co. v. Smith, 216 La. 27, 43 So.2d 148 (1949) ; Gibson v.
Pickens, 187 La. 860, 175 So. 600 (1937) ; Lindner v. Cotonio, 175 La. 352, 143
So. 286 (1932); Bayard v. Baldwin Lumber Co., 157 La. 994, 103 So. 290
(1925) ; Chronos Land Co. v. Crichton, 150 La. 963, 91 So. 408 (1922). But aee
Long v. Chailan, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937).
5. Pan American Production Co. v. Robichaux, 200 La. 666, 8 So.2d 635
(1942).
6. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2275, 2276, 2992, 2997 (1870). As the law requires
that a contract to buy or sell real estate must be in writing, so also must a power
of attorney to make such a contract be in writing. Turner v. Snype, 162 La. 117,
110 So. 109 (1926).
7. Triangle Farms v. Harvey, 178 La. 559, 152 So. 124 (1934) ; Hackenburg
v. Gartskamp, 30 La. Ann. 898 (1878) ; Badon v. Badon, 4 La. 166 (1832).
8. 152 La. 29, 92 So. 723 (1922).
9. Partners of a commercial partnership are the co-owners of all real estate
bought for or by the firm. Succession of Ratcliff, 209 La. 224, 24 So.2d 456
(1945); Brinson v. Monroe Automobile & Supply Co., 180 La. 1064, 158 So. 558
(1935) ; Baca v. Ramos, 10 La. 418 (1836). Property so owned cannot be alienated by one partner without the consent of the others. Weld v. Peters, 1 La. Ann.
432 (1846) ; Thomas v. Scott, 3 Rob. 256 (La. 1842) ; Varnado v. Meyer & Neugass Co., 133 So. 396 (La. App. 1931).
10. When the other partners are informed of the sale and they make no objection but accept part of the purchase price, they thereby ratify it and are estopped
to assert title against a bona fide purchaser. Weld v. Peters, 1 La. Ann. 432
(1846) ; Thomas v. Scott, 3 Rob. 256 (La. 1842) ; Varnado v. Meyer & Neugass
Co., 133 So. 396 (La. App. 1931).
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was purchased as her separate property.1 ' Thus, although the
wife as record owner would have to sell the property as agent of

the community, 12 she could not do this without the written consent of the husband. 8 Yet despite the lack of such written consent, the defendant-vendee was allowed to show by parol certain
conduct of the husband which, the court concluded, showed that
the husband had ratified the act of sale by the wife.' 4 Thus, the
court continued, the husband should not be permitted to upset

the sale "by claiming that he did not sign the act."' 5 This language would perhaps indicate that the court was here permitting
the vendee by parol testimony to supply the husband's signature

in violation of the general rule that title to immovable property
cannot be acquired by estoppel. Such a holding could perhaps

be justified in that the sale by the wife here is closely analogous
to sales by unauthorized partners which have been upheld on

the basis of estoppel.'8 But the court did not base its decision
on that exception to the general rule. On the contrary, at the
close of its opinion the court seems to deny that it is allowing
the husband's signature to be supplied by parol, when it says
"No one here is attempting to acquire property by estoppel. The
wife here had a deed in her name. The defendant has a deed in
his name, which deed was ratified by the husband's acceptance

of the consideration.' 1 7 This language, plus the reliance of the
court on the case of Stewart v. Mix,' 8 indicates another interpretation of the decision.
11. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2405 (1870) : "At the time of the dissolution of the
marriage, all effects which both husband and wife reciprocally possess, are presumed common effects or gains, unless it be satisfactorily proved which of such
effects they brought in marriage, or which have been given them separately, or
which they have respectively inherited."
Property acquired by purchase in the name of the wife alone is presumed to
become property of the community. To rebut such presumption the wife must show
that such property was paid for from her paraphernal funds, that such funds were
administered by her and they were invested by her. Cameron v. Rowland, 215 La.
177, 40 So.2d 1 (1949) ; Betz v. Riviere, 211 La. 43, 29 So.2d 465 (1947).
12. Property purchased by the wife which is presumed to be community property can only be sold by the wife, as agent of the community, since it stands of
record in her name. Garlick v. Dalbey, 147 La. 18, 84 So. 441 (1920).
13. LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 2402, 2404 (1870) ; Roccoforte v. Barbin, 212 La.
69, 31 So.2d 521 (1947) ; Bywater v. Enderle, 175 La. 1098, 145 So. 118 (1932) ;
Thomas v. Winsey, 76 So.2d 33 (La. App. 1954) ; Vanzant v. Morgan, 181 So.
660 (La. App. 1938).
14. Cato v. Bynum, 98 So.2d 257 (La. App. 1957).
15. Id. at 259.
16. See notes 9 and 10 supra. The community of acquets or gains is in a sense
a legal partnership. LA. CIVIL CODE, bk. III, tit. VI, c. 3, Of the Community of
Partnershipof Acquet8 or Gains, § 1, Of Legal Partnership (1870).
17. Cato v. Bynum, 98 So.2d 257, 260 (La. App. 1957).
18. 30 La. Ann. 1036 (1878).
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In the Stewart case, the husband by his conduct was estopped
to assert the community character of property purchased by the
wife during the existence of the community. The husband, prior
to his suit to be declared owner, had acted as if the property
was the separate property of his wife, by permitting taxes to
be assessed and paid in the name of the wife and by assisting
her in the mortgage of the property for her own personal, individual benefit. The court said: "This property may indeed be
community property, but C. S. Stewart has, by his acts and
conduct, debarred himself from asserting it to the prejudice of
third persons."'19 The court then permitted the sale of the property in question as the separate property of the wife.
In the instant case, the plaintiff asserted the presumption
of community property existing in his favor. The wife, had she
been involved in the litigation, could have overcome this presumption by proving that the property in question was purchased as her separate property, with her separate funds which
she administered and invested independently of the husband's
control. 20 The vendee of the wife, the defendant here, was likewise entitled in this way to rebut the presumption that the
property was community. But the plaintiff, by setting up the
sale, being present at its execution and receiving a part of the
purchase price, in effect denied the community character of the
property, holding it out as the separate property of the wife.
Applying the reasoning of the Stewart case, he was estopped by
his conduct to assert the community character of the property
in question, and the defendant was relieved of the normal burden
of proving that the property was in fact the separate property
of the wife. This being so, the act of sale signed only by the
wife was properly translative of title, since a sale of the wife's
separate property does not require the signature of the hus21
band.
The opinion in the instant case is certainly susceptible of
two distinct interpretations. It may be interpreted to mean that
the plaintiff by his conduct ratified the act of sale by the wife
and was estopped to deny that he had not signed the act. On
the other hand, there is authority for the proposition that the
plaintiff was estopped by his conduct, not to deny that he had
signed the act, but to assert the community character of the
19. Id. at 1040.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. LA. R.S. 9:101 (1950)

(Women's Emancipation Act).
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property in question, thus making the act of sale by the wife
alone translative of title as a sale of her separate property.
While arguments may be proposed in support of either interpretation, the latter presents a more salutary result. Under that
interpretation the crux of the problem is centered around the
presumption of community property asserted by the plaintiff
and not the actual transfer of the property involved. This avoids
the necessity of an application of the parol evidence rule and
negatives the possibility that the defendant was acquiring property by estoppel.
Stephen J. Ledet, Jr.

TORTS

-

INJURIOUS RELIANCE

Plaintiff was the employee of defendant, who was engaged
in the severance and sale of timber. Defendant, desiring the
protection of compensation insurance, approached X who regularly purchased timber from defendant and who maintained
compensation insurance for his own employees. X proposed, in
good faith, that the cost of insurance premiums be deducted
regularly from the price to be paid for timber purchased from
defendant by X, and assured defendant that the effect would
be to extend the protection of his policy to defendant's employees. Defendant, relying upon X's representation, made no
further effort to secure compensation coverage. Thereafter
plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment. He
instituted suit for compensation against defendant, X, and X's
insurer. The district court held defendant, X, and X's insurer
liable in solido in tort. On appeal, held, affirmed as to defendant
and reversed as to X and his insurer. However, the court of
appeal, grounding its decision on estoppel, held that X was liable
in damages to defendant,' for whatever amount defendant was
forced to expend toward fulfilling the judgment against him.
One who, with knowledge of the facts, conducts himself so as to
mislead another who relies thereon, is estopped from afterwards
assuming a position inconsistent with his prior position. Carpenter v. Madden, 90 So.2d 508 (La. App. 1956).
A vendee-vendor relationship between the injured claimant's
employer and the defendant will not support a workmen's cor1. The court did not indicate the process by which they allowed defendant to
recover judgment against X, thus leaving a procedural question open; however,
it Is assumed that defendant called X in warranty under Louisiana's Third Party
Practice Act.

